Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, Article 27 (Right to privacy of person, home, correspondence and communication)

Article 27 of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda is the country's core constitutional privacy guarantee and the textual foundation for digital-communications privacy. Article 27(2) provides that no person shall be subjected to interference with the privacy of that person's home, correspondence, communication or other property. Article 27(1) protects against unlawful search of the person and home and unlawful entry of premises. By naming 'correspondence' and 'communication' expressly, the provision extends on its face to electronic messaging, telephone and internet communications and associated data. For the Digital Rights collection, Article 27 satisfies the inclusion bar on both limbs. On the first, it contains express communications-privacy language. On the second, there is identifiable digital- and rights-context interpretation in Ugandan jurisprudence: the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court developed the test for permissible limitations on rights in Charles Onyango-Obbo & Anor v Attorney General (adopting the proportionality standard that a limitation must be 'acceptable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society'), and Article 27 was applied in Victor Juliet Mukasa & Anor v Attorney General to hold a search and seizure unlawful. The Data Protection and Privacy Act 2019 was enacted to give statutory effect to the privacy right that Article 27 protects. The practical strength of the guarantee should not be overstated. Uganda's statutory framework includes the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act 2010, which authorises lawful interception and a state Monitoring Centre, and the Computer Misuse Act 2011 (as amended in 2022); civil-society organisations (including Privacy International, Chapter Four Uganda and CIPESA) have documented surveillance practices and online-speech prosecutions that they argue are inconsistent with Article 27. Enforcement of the constitutional right runs through the Constitutional Court (for interpretation and annulment) and the ordinary courts; there is no specialised constitutional privacy remedy beyond these channels. This entry is a constitutional provision rather than a dedicated digital-rights statute, recorded as an Act with its constitutional character made explicit. It is cross-referenced to Uganda's Computer Misuse Act and underpins the Data Protection and Privacy Act 2019, the Access to Information Act 2005 and the interception regime, all of which engage the Article 27 guarantee.

1. 1Article 27(2) prohibits interference with the privacy of a person's home, correspondence, communication or other property, express basis for digital-communications privacy
2. 2Article 27(1) protects against unlawful search of the person/home and unlawful entry of premises
3. 3Interpreted via the Onyango-Obbo v AG proportionality test for limitations on rights and applied in Victor Mukasa v AG to find a search unlawful
4. 4Foundation for the Data Protection and Privacy Act 2019; engaged by the Interception of Communications Act 2010 and the Computer Misuse Act
5. 5Enforced through the Constitutional Court and ordinary courts; no specialised constitutional privacy remedy
6. 6Inclusion justified on both limbs: express correspondence/communication language (a) and identifiable digital/rights-context case law (b)